By Mitt Romney

 

My criticism of the New START treaty generated both praise and disparagement. Sen. Richard Lugar’s thoughtful critique of my position deserves further discussion.

 

1. New START does limit U.S. missile-defense options. First, New START’s preamble not only references missile defense, it accedes to Russia’s insistence that there is an interrelationship between strategic offensive weapons and missile defense. While the Bush administration steadfastly refused to accept this Russian position, the Obama administration bows to it. The statement of interrelationship in the preamble, in addition to the specific missile-defense measures in the body of the treaty, amount to a major concession to Russia.

 

The treaty’s advocates dismiss the preamble reference as non-binding. But the significance of including missile-defense provisions in an offensive-weapons treaty is not lost on either signatory. Further, the Russians assert that the preamble does indeed constitute a binding limit on our missile-defense program, both in their Unilateral Statement and in subsequent public statements. Gen. Yevgeniy Buzinskiy, who served as the chief of the International Treaty Directorate in the Russian Ministry of Defense during the treaty’s negotiations, insists that any increase in our ABM system could be claimed as a breach of the treaty. Such ambiguity and pressure, and fear of being accused of violating the treaty, could strongly restrain American presidents from aggressively developing and deploying missile defense. The 1972 ABM Treaty provides historical precedent for such a chilling effect: Fearful that U.S. theater-missile-defense systems would be viewed as violating the treaty, we pulled back from realizing the full potential of such systems.

 

Further, the treaty prohibits our conversion of ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers for the launching of defensive interceptors. Such conversions may well not be part of the Obama administration’s current plans, but they could surely be part of a subsequent administration’s. Past missile-defense agency directors and naval planners have objected to precluding SLBM-launcher conversions, capable as they could be of defending America and our allies from diverse and undisclosed locations. Such conversions were prohibited by the ABM Treaty during the Cold War — a treaty from which we have withdrawn — but the Obama administration is consenting to their renewed prohibition by New START. Under its terms, there could be an average of four or more SLBM tubes on each of our strategic submarines that no longer contain ballistic missiles but may not be converted for defensive interceptors, and so are empty.

 

 

The sixth agreed statement of the treaty’s protocol suggests that telemetry data on missiles governed by the treaty is not to be used for strategic-missile-defense purposes. In the long term, agreeing to this limitation could prove to have been very short-sighted.

 

Finally, treaty analysts at the Heritage Foundation have opined that “the most serious threat to missile defense in the New START treaty is contained in the power given to the Treaty compliance forum, the Bilateral Consultative Commission. . . . Missile defense is directly within the purview of the BCC.” Treaty proponents note that substantive changes to the treaty cannot be made by the BCC. But the BCC can — without Senate advice and consent — make changes to the treaty’s definitions and agreed statements, including those involving missile defense. The treaty Protocol assigns to BCC the defining of missile defense and key terms relating to the conversion of ICBM silos for defensive interceptors. An administration that wished to further limit missile defense without the advice and consent of the Senate could do so through the BCC. In the past, under START I, the JCIC, a body comparable to the BCC, did indeed make substantive changes to that treaty’s terms without Senate consent.

 

2. We should not countenance Russia’s ten-to-one tactical-nuclear-weapons advantage. These weapons constitute a real threat to our forces abroad, and to our allies in Europe and Asia. Russian-military spokesmen have asserted that they will rely on their tactical nuclear weapons to dominate regional or local conflicts near their borders. Cynically, they call the use of such weapons “de-escalating” by reasoning that it would end a conflict promptly on Russian terms.

 

In signing the 2002 Moscow Treaty, we similarly ignored Russia’s tactical-nuclear-weapons advantage. We accepted it because: 1) the treaty placed no limits on our number of launchers — we could have added our own tactical nuclear capabilities relatively easily; 2) the treaty was flexible regarding strategic nuclear weapons; and 3) Russia was believed to be moving toward responsible global citizenship. But under New START, launchers are strictly limited and flexibility is removed, while Russia has embarked upon a path reminiscent of its Cold War past.

 

Note also that Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons, including nuclear-armed cruise missiles, could be deployed on Russia’s submarine fleet — an option specifically raised by the deputy chief of the Russian navy, Vice Adm. Oleg Burtsev — thereby posing a direct threat to the United States. And tactical nukes can be refabricated or remanufactured for strategic objectives.